Construction Contracting

In Joe Tex’s song about unrequited love, the Southern Soul singer belts out, “I gotcha, never shoulda promised to me.” Joe Tex may have thought this approach is the right one for romantic disappointment, but parties to a contract have a different set of obligations.

A lawsuit by Washington State contractor Nova Contracting should serve as an alert to owners dealing with the assessment of a contractor’s performance. Nova’s lawsuit came about because of the owner’s termination of the contract. Nova claimed the owner was using a “gotcha” review process for its submittals that was designed to prevent performance. The trial court agreed with the owner.

Culvert_with_a_dropNova appealed and the court of appeals found sufficient questions of fact to send the dispute back to the trial court. The opinion offers insight into fair dealing and good faith in the performance of construction contracts. Nova Contracting, Inc. v. City of Olympia, No. 48644-0-II (Wash Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2017). Continue Reading Good faith and fair dealing puts an end to the “gotcha” in submittal review

Claims for personal injuries that can be connected in some way to construction work often include allegations that the contractor was negligent. Even if the injured party sues only the property owner, the owner will often seek to pass this liability through to the contractor. In many states, such negligence claims are barred by the acceptance doctrine, which limits contractor liability to third parties for injuries that occur after the owner has accepted the work.

A recent decision by the Missouri Court of Appeals illustrates and applies this rule. In Wilson v Dura-Seal and Stripe, Inc., No. ED 104570 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar 21, 2017), the plaintiff alleged that she tripped in an area paved by Dura-Seal and Stripe, Inc. Dura-Seal paved a drive lane, but the paving did not extend all the way to the curb. The result was a gutter area and a resulting height differential. Ms. Wilson claimed she tripped on and because of the height differential.  Ms. Wilson sued the school district for which Dura-Seal did the work. The school district then sued Dura-Seal.

The trial court granted summary judgment for Dura-Seal because the work had been accepted. The court of appeals affirmed. Under Missouri law, a contractor is not liable for third party personal injuries after the owner accepts the work. The acceptance doctrine is founded on the assumption that the owner has made a reasonably careful inspection of the work of the contractor and the owner knows of the defects, if any. The owner then “accepts the defects and negligence that caused them as his own.” Continue Reading How the acceptance doctrine protects Missouri contractors from personal injury liability

The Missouri Court of Appeals decision in Penzel Constr. Co. v. Jackson R-2 School District, No. ED103878 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2017), is an important development for public construction contracting in Missouri. The decision adopts the Spearin Doctrine and approves the use of the Modified Total Cost method for proving damages. While these concepts have been used widely in federal construction contracting, the Penzel decision is the first published decision recognizing them in Missouri.

The Penzel case involved additions to a public high school. The School District hired an architect. The architect retained an electrical engineering sub-consultant. When the project went to bid, the School District furnished bidders with the architect’s plans and specifications. Penzel Construction Company submitted a bid as the general contractor.

Penzel’s electrical subcontractor was Total Electric. Total’s bid was $1,040,444. Neither Penzel nor Total “noticed” any errors, omissions, or other problems with the plans and specifications during the bidding process.

Total encountered delays totaling 16 months, which Total attributed to “defects and inadequacies” in the electrical design. Under a liquidating agreement between Penzel and Total, Penzel sued the District. Penzel alleged that the District impliedly warranted the design. Penzel claimed the design was not adequate for completing the project.

In addition to proving liability, Penzel needed to prove the damages associated with its loss of productivity claim. To do so, Penzel sought to use the Modified Total Cost Method. The claimed damages were comprised of additional project management and supervision costs, wage escalation, unpaid change order work, and consultant’s fees. Continue Reading The Spearin Doctrine and Modified Total Cost claims on Missouri public projects

https://www.transportation.gov/fastlane/enbridge-updateIn a Presidential Memorandum issued January 24, 2017, President Trump directed the Secretary of Commerce to develop a plan within 180 days to require that pipelines in the United States use materials and equipment produced in the United States “to the maximum extent possible and to the extent permitted by law.” The plan will extend to newly constructed pipelines as well as to those that are “retrofitted, repaired and expanded . . . inside the borders of the United States.”

With respect to iron or steel products, the Memorandum makes it clear that all stages of the manufacturing process must occur in the United States. The Memorandum states:

“Produced in the United States” shall mean:

(i)        With regard to iron or steel products, that all manufacturing processes for such iron or steel products, from the initial melting stage through the application of coatings, occurred in the United States.

(ii)       Steel or iron material or products manufactured abroad from semi-finished steel or iron from the United States are not “produced in the United States” for purposes of this memorandum.

(iii)      Steel or iron material or products manufactured in the United States from semi-finished steel or iron of foreign origin are not “produced in the United States” for purposes of this memorandum.

The notions that iron and steel products must be manufactured in the United States and that all of the manufacturing processes must occur in the United States are not new. Substantially similar requirements are used in the “Buy America” provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. See 49 U.S.C. § 5323(j)The Federal Transit Administration and the Federal Highway Administration have used this approach for state and local highway and transit projects funded wholly or partially with federal funds. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 661.5. Continue Reading President Trump mandates “Buy American” for construction of US pipelines

We have previously written about the Department of Labor’s effort to expand the scope of its regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction over government contractors against the wishes of Congress and even fellow federal agencies. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia struck down an attempt by the DOL to significantly expand the Davis-Bacon Act to apply to the construction of a Public-Private Partnership project. The Davis-Bacon Act requires that contractors on federal and DC government construction projects pay prevailing wages and fringe benefits to the workers on such projects. DOL sought to apply the Act to CityCenterDC, which is a mixed-use development on the site of the DC Convention Center. This project includes 60 retail stores, various private offices, approximately 700 residential units, and a 370-room luxury hotel.  Continue Reading DC Circuit rules that the Davis-Bacon Act does not apply to Public-Private Partnership project

The Supreme Court’s decision in Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, No. 12-1497 (U.S. May 26, 2015) [pdf], holds that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act applies only to criminal offenses. It also holds that the first-to-file bar in the False Claims Act applies only when an earlier-filed action remains “pending.” BALAD AIR BASE, Iraq.  Staff Sgt. Gary Messer, 332nd Expeditionary Aerospace Medical Squadron bioenvironmental engineer, transfers a sample of tap water to a tube before performing tests to confirm that the water is free from bacteria. March 13, 2008. (U.S. Air Force photo / Senior Airman Julianne Showalter.)The unanimous opinion, written by Justice Alito, takes a plain-meaning approach to both of the questions presented.

The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act

Citing dictionary definitions of the word “offense” and the appearance of the WSLA in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the Court inferred that Congress intended to toll the applicable statutes of limitations only in criminal cases. As to the removal of the phrase “now indictable” from the text of the WSLA in 1944, the Court found that such a subtle change does not prove that Congress intended to expand the tolling effect of the WSLA beyond criminal cases. “[T]he removal of the ‘now indictable’ provision was more plausibly driven by Congress’ intent to apply the WSLA prospectively, not by any desire to expand the WSLA’s reach to civil suits.”

Carter reverses the Fourth Circuit’s holding in United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2013) as to the scope of the WSLA. Continue Reading KBR v. US ex rel. Carter—a plain-meaning approach to the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act and the False Claims Act first-to-file bar

The contractor’s duty to proceed with performance pending the resolution of disputes is a basic concept in the law of government contracts. It is laid out explicitly in FAR 52.233-1(i), the mandatory disputes clause that appears in nearly all federal contracts: “The Contractor shall proceed diligently with performance of this contract, pending final resolution of any request for relief, claim, appeal, or action arising under the contract, and comply with any decision of the Contracting Officer.”

But the duty to proceed has important limits. A contractor is excused from its duty to proceed and may stop work if the government materially breaches its own obligations under the contract.

Breaches occur in many contexts. A cardinal change in the scope of work is a breach that excuses a contractor’s performance. Terminating a contract just to get a lower price is a breach. Refusing to pay for a contractor’s work without an adequate excuse is also a breach.

According to the decision in Kiewit-Turner v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, CBCA No. 3450 (Dec. 9, 2014) [pdf], the government breaches the contract by ordering a contractor to continue performance when it is clear that there will be no funds available to pay for the work. The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals recognized Kiewit-Turner‘s right to stop work when the Department of Veteran Affairs failed to provide a design that would have allowed construction to be completed within the budget established by the available appropriations. Despite the general duty to proceed, Kiewit-Turner was not required to continue performance because it was clear that the construction costs would exceed the available funds and the VA refused to seek additional funding or incorporate value engineering changes to reduce the overall construction cost. Continue Reading Kiewit-Turner and the right to stop work

If you are getting ready to submit a claim on a federal contract—especially one that challenges an assessment of liquidated damages—take note of the Federal Circuit’s decision in K-Con Building Systems, Inc. v. United States, No. 2014-5062 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2015) [pdf]. It has some specific instructions for the contents of your claim letter and demonstrates the harsh results that follow from a misstep in the disputes process.

U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Bethannie Kittrell.  August 26, 2013.K-Con held a Federal Supply Schedule contract for prefabricated structures. In 2004, it won a $582,000 Coast Guard task order for the design and construction of a Coast Guard cutter support building at Port Huron, Michigan.

K-Con’s July 2005 Claim

When K-Con was unable to complete the work by the deadline set forth in the task order, the Coast Guard assessed liquidated damages of $109,554—186 days at $589 per day. On July 28, 2005, K-Con submitted a one-page claim letter seeking remission of the liquidated damages.

Although it was brief, K-Con’s letter asserted three reasons why the liquidated damages assessment was improper:

  1. K-Con “was not the sole cause of any alleged delays” and any K-Con delays were “concurrent with delays caused by the government;”
  2. the government “failed to issue extension to the completion date as a result of changes to the contract by the government;” and
  3. the liquidated damages “are an impermissible penalty.”

K-Con’s letter requested a contracting officer’s final decision. Though it demanded relief of more than $100,000, K-Con’s letter asserted that a certification was not required “since the assessment of liquidated damages is a claim by the Government.”

Continue Reading Claims for remission of liquidated damages after the Federal Circuit’s decision in K-Con Building Systems

The Senate passed the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 [pdf] on Friday, December 12, 2014. President Obama is expected to sign the bill into law. The $585 billion bill authorizes the Pentagon’s activities in FY 2015. It includes $521.3 billion in base defense spending and another $64 billion in war funding. Here is a summary of the procurement reform initiatives that will be relevant to contractors in the upcoming year:

  1. Cyber incident reporting for operationally critical contractors. Section 1632 of the 2015 NDAA directs the Secretary of Defense to designate and notify “operationally critical contractors,” a term narrowly defined in the bill. After notification, designated contractors will be required to report to the Department of Defense each cyber incident with respect to any network or information system of such contractor. Reports must include: an assessment of the effect on the contractor’s ability to meet the Department’s contractual requirements; the technique used in the cyber incident; any sample of malicious software obtained; and a summary of information compromised by the incident. Despite the disclosure requirement, section 1632 provides for protection of contractor trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information. It also limits the dissemination of information obtained to relevant entities and agencies.
  2. Enhanced authority for non-DOD Chief Information Officers. Section 831 of the NDAA increases the role of Chief Information Officers of agencies other than the Department of Defense. It provides that an agency may not enter into a contract for information technology unless the contract has first been reviewed and approved by the agency’s Chief Information Officer. The head of each covered agency must ensure that its Chief Information Officer has a significant role in all annual and multi-year planning, budgeting, and reporting related to information technology. The bill requires the Director of OMB and the Chief Information Officers of appropriate agencies to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of information technology investments and to develop opportunities to consolidate the acquisition and management of information technology services. The Chief Information Officer of each covered agency is directed to inventory agency data centers and develop a multi-year strategy for consolidation and optimization of those data centers inventoried.
  3. DOD CIO positions consolidated. Section 901 of the 2015 NDAA incorporates a DOD proposal to combine the positions of Chief Information Officer and Deputy Chief Management Officer into the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Business Management and Information. The new Under Secretary will oversee business operations, personnel, and IT projects and will be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. This change will not take place until the next administration. Continue Reading Six contracting policy changes in the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act

Now for some good news in government contracts law. On February 11, 2014, a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit reversed the Court of Federal Claims decisions in Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 334 (2011) (Metcalf I) and Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 786 (2012) (Metcalf II). The case has been remanded for further proceedings and application of the correct legal standards. A copy of the Federal Circuit’s decision is available here.

No requirement for proof of specific targeting

The main issue on appeal in Metcalf was the legal standard applicable to contractor claims that the government breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Court of Federal Claims concluded that the decision in Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 829 (Fed. Cir. 2010) requires proof of specific targeting—that Government actions were “specifically designed to reappropriate the benefits” of a contract. Incompetence and failure to cooperate are not enough.

The Federal Circuit rejects this analysis. “The trial court misread Precision Pine, which does not impose a specific-targeting requirement applicable across the board or in this case.”

The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Metcalf also rejects the Government’s attempt to limit the scope of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Citing Precision Pine, the Government argued that the duty of good faith and fair dealing “cannot expand a party’s contractual duties beyond those in the express contract or create duties inconsistent with the contract’s provisions.” In its appellate brief, the Government urged a broad application of that language that would almost always preclude a good faith and fair dealing claim. Citing its interpretation, the Government argued that Metcalf’s claim must fail because it could not “identify a contract provision that the Navy’s inspection process violated.”

That argument went nowhere with the Federal Circuit. According to the court’s decision, the Government’s interpretation “goes too far:  a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not require a violation of an express provision of the contract.”

Continue Reading How the Federal Circuit’s decision in Metcalf Construction fixes good faith and fair dealing