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Brian Waagner

Brian is the leader of the Government Contracts practice group at Husch Blackwell LLP. Brian represents contractors in federal, state, and local bid protests, contract administration and compliance matters, and in litigation involving complex claims and disputes.

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Contractors interested in the application of FOIA Exemption 4 should take note of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in American Small Business League v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 15-15120 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 2017). The issue in the case was whether a declaration submitted by a Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation employee was sufficient to show the competitive harm necessary to withhold small business subcontracting data obtained from Sikorsky. The Sikorsky declaration was short, but it identified Sikorsky’s competitors and asserted that its small business subcontracting data could be used to gain a competitive advantage.

In a November 2014 order, the District Court found the declaration too vague. It lacked “reasonably specific detail” as to the likelihood of competitive injury. It did not show how information found in the subcontracting plan would be “likely to cause substantial competitive injury.” Proof of competitive harm was based only on the fact that a Sikorsky competitor “could” use Sikorsky’s data to cause harm. In the words of District Judge William Alsup, “[t]hat is not enough to grant summary judgment for the agency.” The District Court ordered the government to produce Sikorsky’s master subcontracting plan, subject only to appeal.

GAO has published its decision denying multiple protests of the Defense Health Agency’s decision to award the T-2017 managed care support contracts to Humana Government Business, Inc. and Health Net Federal Services, LLC. Humana won the TRICARE contract for the east region with a total evaluated price of $40.7 billion. Health Net won the west region contract with a total evaluated price of $17.7 billion.

One of the key issues addressed in GAO’s decision was the challenge to Humana’s past performance rating. Anthem subsidiary WellPoint Military Care Corporation argued that DHA placed so much weight on prior experience as a TRICARE prime contractor that incumbency amounted to an unstated evaluation criterion. In WellPoint’s view, incumbency was the “golden ticket to attaining the highest Substantial Confidence rating.”

GAO found no merit to WellPoint’s argument. There was nothing in the record to suggest that DHA treated incumbency as an unstated evaluation criterion. Indeed, DHA considered WellPoint’s own past performance superior to that of two other incumbent TRICARE contractors—Health Net and UnitedHealth Military & Veterans Services, LLC.

GAO also rejected the legal basis for WellPoint’s argument. While incumbency is not necessarily a golden ticket, GAO also found that it was reasonable to give credit to Humana for its prior experience managing a large TRICARE regional contract. In GAO’s view, “it is not unreasonable for an agency to place particular emphasis on a firm’s performance as an incumbent contractor, since such performance may be reasonably viewed as a more accurate indication of likely future performance . . . .”

Incumbency is not necessarily a golden ticket, but it certainly can’t hurt.

The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, No. 15-7 (U.S. June 16, 2016), upholds the viability of the implied certification theory of False Claims Act liability. But it also makes cases arising from minor instances of noncompliance much harder to prove. The Court held that a knowing failure to disclose a violation of a material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement can create False Claims Act liability. The requirement need not be an express condition of payment, but it must be material to the Government’s decision to pay.

The requirement for proof of a misleading half-truth

Those hoping that the Court would eliminate implied certification altogether will be disappointed with the decision. It opens up the possibility of new False Claims Act cases in the Seventh Circuit and in other jurisdictions that had rejected the implied certification theory or limited its application to conditions of payment. Some cases that might have been thrown out on a motion to dismiss might stand a better chance of surviving through discovery and trial.

The Court nevertheless takes strong steps to limit misuse of the implied certification theory. According to the opinion in Escobar, liability under the implied certification theory can be imposed only when two conditions are satisfied. First, the claim for payment must make “specific representations about the goods or services provided.” An invoice that makes no affirmative statement about the quality of a contractor’s goods or services cannot be the basis for an implied certification.

[UPDATE: The Supreme Court resolved the Escobar case in a unanimous decision published on June 16, 2015. A link to our discussion of the Court’s opinion is available here.]

In some courts in the United States today, a government contractor or a healthcare provider seeking reimbursement from a federal program can violate the False Claims Act even when its work is satisfactory and its invoices are correct. Under the theory of “implied certification,” a minor instance of non-compliance with one of the thousands of applicable statutes, regulations, and contract provisions can be the basis for a federal investigation, years of litigation, as well as fines, penalties, suspension and debarment, even imprisonment of company personnel.

This week, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, Docket No. 15-7, a case involving the viability of the implied certification theory. Here, we look at the questions posed during oral argument to see if we can infer how the Court might resolve the case.

The Supreme Court agreed to consider two questions posed in Escobar. First, the Court agreed to address the current split in the circuits as to the viability of the implied certification theory. The First Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Services, Inc., 780 F.3d 504 (1st Cir. 2015), broadly adopts implied certification. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2015), firmly rejects it.

The Government Accountability Office has been publishing its annual bid protest statistics report to Congress since fiscal year 1995. That year GAO received 2,334 new protests and closed 2,528. For FY 2015, GAO reports that it received 2,496 new protests and closed 2,647.

Given the changes in contract law and the significant increase in expenditures on federal contracts over the last 20 years, these figures are remarkably consistent.

For Fiscal Year 2015, GAO reports that protesters obtained some form of relief in 45 percent of cases closed, either as the result of an agency’s voluntary corrective action or a decision sustaining some or all of the protest grounds. This “effectiveness rate” is marginally higher than it has been in the previous several years, when it hovered between 42 percent and 43 percent.

Winning bases for bid protests

One interesting piece of data added to GAO’s annual report in the last couple of years is the summary of the “most prevalent grounds for sustaining protests.” This new data element is the result of a requirement in a 2013 amendment to the Competition in Contracting Act. See 31 U.S.C. § 3554(e)(2).

In FY 2015, GAO identified five grounds of protest as the most prevalent. Even though it is drawn from only a small subset of protests that are actually resolved on the merits, GAO’s list of reasons for sustaining protests provides a roadmap for future protesters. Here is GAO’s list, along with a brief summary of the decision that GAO cites to illustrate it.

Criminal charges for minimum wage violations are certainly rare. But the November 2015 indictment of electrical contractor Marcus Butler shows that they are possible. Mr. Butler faces jail time and heavy fines for allegedly making false certifications regarding $126,514 in Davis-Bacon Act wages on three HUD multi-family housing projects.

Given the rarity of criminal indictments for wage-and-hour violations, I infer that Mr. Butler’s alleged conduct was much worse than simply miscalculating the prevailing wage or losing track of some payroll records. But there is nothing in the indictment that would reveal the underlying aggravating factors that motivated it. The Government asserts simply that Mr. Butler participated in a “scheme” and that he “knowingly and willfully” overstated wages and benefits on his 61 separate certified payrolls (DOL Form WH-347).

It will probably be some time before we see whether this is case is the result of overreaching conduct by DOL and government attorneys (like another recent DOL case) or the application of the new Justice Department policy set forth in the Yates Memorandum on Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing. This new policy will almost certainly increase the number of criminal charges arising from ordinary non-compliance and administrative oversight. Husch Blackwell’s client alert on the Yates Memorandum is available here.

Either way, now is the right time for federal contractors to take on the task of reviewing and updating their own HR policies and practices.

Contracts with Virginia agencies, counties, municipal governments, and school boards are governed by the Virginia Public Procurement Act. The Act requires the use of competitive procedures in the solicitation and award of public contracts. It also establishes a procedure for the submission and resolution of bid protests. See Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-4360(A).

How and when to protest a contract award decision

An actual or prospective bidder seeking to challenge the award of a Virginia government contract must submit a protest to the procuring agency or to an official designated by the agency. The protest must be submitted in writing. It must include the basis for the protest and the relief sought. A bid protest must be submitted no later than ten days after the award or the announcement of the decision to award, whichever occurs first. This deadline is extended if the protest depends on obtaining access to documents. In those situations, the protest must be submitted within ten days after the records are made available. The VPPA does not specifically allow for the submission of a pre-award protest that challenges the terms and conditions of a solicitation.

If a protest is timely filed, the award and performance of the contract is automatically stayed unless the agency determines in writing that “proceeding without delay is necessary to protect the public interest or unless that bid or offer would expire.”  Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-4362.

Tennessee law explicitly provides interested parties the right to protest the terms of a solicitation for a contract with a state agency or the award or intended award of a state government contract. In each case, Tennessee’s procurement code and procurement regulations require the submission of a protest letter directed to the “Chief Procurement Officer” located in Nashville.

What is required to file a protest?

Bid protests be submitted in writing and identify all of the reasons for the protest. They should be presented in the form of a letter that identifies the solicitation and the interested parties and summarizes the grounds for the protest. The specific grounds of protest that are available under Tennessee law are listed at Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0690-03-01-.12(2)(a).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, No. 12-1497 (U.S. May 26, 2015) [pdf], holds that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act applies only to criminal offenses. It also holds that the first-to-file bar in the False Claims Act applies only when an earlier-filed action remains “pending.” The unanimous opinion, written by Justice Alito, takes a plain-meaning approach to both of the questions presented.

The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act

Citing dictionary definitions of the word “offense” and the appearance of the WSLA in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the Court inferred that Congress intended to toll the applicable statutes of limitations only in criminal cases. As to the removal of the phrase “now indictable” from the text of the WSLA in 1944, the Court found that such a subtle change does not prove that Congress intended to expand the tolling effect of the WSLA beyond criminal cases. “[T]he removal of the ‘now indictable’ provision was more plausibly driven by Congress’ intent to apply the WSLA prospectively, not by any desire to expand the WSLA’s reach to civil suits.”

Carter reverses the Fourth Circuit’s holding in United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2013) as to the scope of the WSLA.

The 2015 amendments to the anti-trafficking provisions in the Federal Acquisition Regulation will apply to all federal contracts and subcontracts awarded after March 2, 2015. Existing IDIQ contracts for which additional orders are anticipated will be modified “on a bilateral basis” to include the new language in FAR 52.222-50. See 80 Fed. Reg. 4967 (Jan. 29, 2015). The changes implement the requirements outlined in Executive Order 13627 (Sept. 25, 2012) and the anti-trafficking provisions of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law No. 112-239 (Jan. 2, 2013), codified in 22 U.S.C. Chapter 78.

Here we present some of the background on the original FAR clause and a summary of the new requirements. A redline version of the 2015 amendments to FAR 52.222-50 is available here.

The original FAR language on human trafficking

A contract clause prohibiting severe forms of human trafficking, procurement of commercial sex acts, and the use of forced labor has appeared in federal service contracts since April 2006. See 71 Fed. Reg. 20301 (Apr. 19, 2006) [pdf]. The 2006 version of the anti-trafficking clause included a general prohibition applicable to federal service contractors and a requirement to establish policies and procedures to ensure employee compliance. It required contractors to notify employees of the policy and to establish an appropriate employee awareness program. It required contractors to notify the government of an alleged violation and specified penalties for human trafficking violations. The original interim version of FAR 52.222-50 was also a mandatory flowdown in all subcontracts for the acquisition of services.

FAR 52.222-50 was expanded in 2007 to cover all federal contracts and subcontracts, including those for supplies and for commercial items. See 72 Fed. Reg. 46335 (Aug. 7, 2007). The clause was revised again in January 2009. See 74 Fed. Reg. 2741 (Jan. 15, 2009). The main substantive addition at that time was the addition of language making it clear that a contracting officer could consider the adoption of a Trafficking in Persons awareness program as a mitigating factor in determining the appropriate remedy for a trafficking violation.

The 2015 FAR amendments

The 2015 amendments to FAR Subpart 22.17 and FAR 52.222-50 go well beyond the original requirements. They introduce a list of specific types of conduct that had not previously appeared in the clause. They add a requirement for many contractors to implement trafficking compliance plans and to certify the absence of any trafficking activities every year. They also modify the mandatory disclosure obligations and specify the minimum level of cooperation required of contractors responding to a trafficking investigation. Finally, the amendments to the FAR clause expand the list of contracting relationships subject to the anti-trafficking clause.