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Subcontracting is often the best way to complete a complex project. A subcontractor may have technical expertise, equipment, or human resources that are unavailable to the prime contractor. But assigning work to one or more lower-tier parties carries with it a certain amount of risk. One of the challenges is allocating liability for changes in the scope of work, delays, and other inefficiencies that increase a subcontractor’s cost or time for performance. Today we look at how the allocation of this risk is affected by the Severin doctrine.

The Severin doctrine takes its name from the decision in Severin v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 435 (1943). Severin employed a subcontractor on a contract to build a post office in Rochester, New York. As a result of construction delays, Severin sought to recover $702 on behalf of its subcontractor.

The Court of Claims (now the Court of Federal Claims) gave two reasons for rejecting the claim. First, the court held that the subcontractor could not sue on its own because it had no contract directly with the government. The government had waived its sovereign immunity only for its direct contractual agreements.

Second, the court held that Severin could not pursue a claim on the subcontractor’s behalf because Severin itself could not be held liable for the same damages under its subcontract agreement.

A strict application of the Severin doctrine would increase risks for both prime contractors and subcontractors and would hamper the efficient resolution of claims. It would restrict the use of no-damage-for-delay clauses and other risk-shifting clauses that have widely been seen as effective. But in practice, the Severin doctrine has not been strictly enforced.

Contractors have the constitutional right to rebut past performance evaluations before they are stigmatized by the government’s assessments in the future. See Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980). But full exercise of this right has the potential to conflict with the practical interest in efficient government procurement. The final revisions to the rules governing the process for reporting and appealing past performance evaluations demonstrate that the two ideals are not easily balanced. The Federal Register notice announcing the final revision to FAR 42.1503 can be found at 78 Fed. Reg. 46783 (Aug. 1, 2013) [pdf].

Helpful rules revisions

First the good news. The August 2013 final revisions to the rules requiring the government to evaluate past performance retain the existing requirement to allow contactor rebuttal and appeal. Commenters to the government’s proposal were unanimously against scrapping or substantially modifying the process. As summarized in the discussion of the final rule, commenters insisted that the appeals process “ensures that individual Government rater bias or lack of understanding of the complete program, not just contracting issues, can be brought out and addressed.” According to one commenter, at least 30 percent of past performance evaluation appeals result in substantive changes. The final rule maintains verbatim the language of former FAR 42.1503(b), now located at FAR 42.1503(d).

The Contract Disputes Act imposes a six-year statute of limitations on all claims, whether they are asserted by the contractor or by the Government. See 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A). The limitations period begins to run upon accrual of a claim, which is “the date when all events . . . that fix the alleged liability of either the Government or the contractor and permit assertion of the claim . . . were known or should have been known.” FAR 33.201. Because six years must pass before the claim expires, the precise date of accrual is often little more than an academic question. Indeed, there have been relatively few cases applying the CDA limitations period to Government claims. But accrual has recently become a real and sometimes insurmountable obstacle to Government claims. Here is a short summary of the basic concepts that have emerged from the decisions that have addressed the issue.

1.         The government has the burden of proving timeliness. 

The CDA limitations period is “jurisdictional.” When the government asserts a claim against a contractor, the government has the burden of proving jurisdiction. To do so, the government must establish that the claim was timely asserted. If the government cannot show that the claim was asserted within six years of accrual, the Board or the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim. Raytheon Missile Systems, ASBCA No. 58011 (Jan. 28, 2013) [pdf].

Under the OFCCP’s final rule announced on August 27, 2013, federal contractors and subcontractors that meet the applicability criteria will be required to meet new goals for hiring protected veterans and individuals with disabilities. For veterans, the new “benchmark” is based on the percentage of veterans in the civilian labor force (currently 8 percent) or…

The GAO’s decision in BC Peabody Constr. Serv., Inc., B-408023 (May 10, 2013) [pdf] illustrates the importance of establishing prejudice in a bid protest. The protester alleged that it proposed the same subcontractor (Bauer Foundation Corporation) as the awardee proposed on a dike rehabilitation project. Both offerors relied on Bauer for the “cut-off wall,” a critical element of the project. Both proposals showed that Bauer had the required experience for the cut-off wall.

Despite their use of the same subcontractor, the Corps of Engineers nevertheless assigned the awardee and the protester different scores for the cut-off wall element of their proposals. The Corps rated the awardee’s proposal acceptable for both the demonstrated experience and past performance subfactors, but it rated the protester’s proposal unacceptable.  The GAO agreed the Corps’s action was procurement error. “Where multiple proposals propose the same contractor, once the agency becomes aware of that subcontractor’s experience . . . it cannot reasonably assign one proposal a higher score than another based on that experience.” GAO nevertheless denied the protest.

The Small Business Administration is continuing the task of implementing several regulatory changes required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (NDAA) [pdf]. One such change occurred on May 7th when the SBA published an interim final rule (RIN 3245-AG55) [pdf] enacting section 1697 of the NDAA and amending 13 CFR 127.503 [pdf]. The interim final rule removes  the statutory cap on set-aside contracts for Women Owned Small Businesses (WOSB) and Economically Disadvantaged Women Owned Small Businesses (EDWOSBs).

Section 827 of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act [pdf] permanently enhances whistleblower protections for employees of DoD and NASA contractors and sub-contractors. Section 828 establishes a“pilot program” to provide enhanced whistleblower protections for employees of civilian

agency contractors and subcontractors for the next four years. In plain English, here is a look at what the enhanced…

Congress continues to promote opportunities for small business contractors to do business with the federal government. It also continues to increase the penalties for those taking unfair advantage of small business opportunities. Here is a look at the most recent set of carrots and sticks, which appear in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.

1. Subcontracts with “similarly situated” small businesses

Section 1651 of the 2013 NDAA provides a new exception to the small business subcontracting cap, which restricts small businesses from subcontracting more than 50 percent of the amount paid under a services contract. With the passage of NDAA, the amount paid under any subcontract with a small business concern that has the same small business status as the prime contractor is excluded from the small business subcontracting cap. The term “similarly situated entities” includes service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses, HUBZone small businesses, women-owned small businesses, and economically disadvantaged women-owned small businesses.

This provision also changes the method for calculating the 50-percent subcontracting cap. Previously, the subcontracting limits in FAR 52.219-14 counted only direct labor costs. Under section 1651, “amount paid” under a subcontract, including labor, material, and other direct costs, is used to determine the 50-percent subcontracting cap. This is a strong incentive for small business prime contractors to award subcontracts to similarly situated small businesses. The old formula continues to govern subcontracting limitations for construction contracts, but the NDAA directs the SBA to establish similar limitations on construction contracts.

The penalty for violating the subcontracting cap is the greater of $500,000 or the dollar amount expended over the cap. The “amount expended” clause is a new penalty.

We have dedicated multiple posts to understanding the scope of jurisdiction over protests of task and delivery orders. Previous posts can be found here and here. Thanks to an amendment contained in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act [pdf], the issue remains somewhat unsettled. Fortunately, Congress still has a few years to set the record straight.

Before the 2013 NDAA, disappointed offerors could protest the issuance of task and delivery orders valued over $10 million regardless of whether the order was issued by a civilian or Department of Defense (DoD) agency. Both of the authorizing statutes providing for task order protest jurisdiction on civilian and DoD orders over $10 million were set to expire on September 30, 2016 (the “sunset provisions”).

Section 830 of the 2013 NDAA amends 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(e) by eliminating the sunset provision, providing for permanent GAO jurisdiction over challenges to DoD task and delivery orders over $10 million. However, this amendment applies only to the statute authorizing jurisdiction over DoD task and delivery orders. The corresponding statute providing for task order protest jurisdiction over civilian agency task and delivery orders over $10 million, 41 U.S.C. § 4106(e), is still set to expire on September 16, 2016. 

BP’s November 2012 settlement of the federal criminal charges stemming from the Deepwater Horizon spill left some important issues unresolved. It left open claims for billions in civil penalties and natural resource damages, which go to trial on February 25, 2013. And even though the Gulf of Mexico spill had no connection to BP’s government contracts, the criminal settlement led to BP’s formal suspension [pdf] from federal contracting. The suspension means that BP will be unable to obtain new oil supply or lease contracts with the United States government until the EPA Suspension and Debarment Official finds it to be “presently responsible.”

BP is by no means the only company to have been suspended or debarred as a result of environmental violations. EPA has authority to suspend or debar companies for violating the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Indeed it is common for the EPA to seek suspension or debarment in environmental crimes cases. A company convicted of violating the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act may even be automatically suspended or debarred. Although such a mandatory suspension or debarment applies only to the facility where the violation occurred, EPA can expand the sanction to the entire company. That is precisely the approach that EPA took with BP after the Deepwater Horizon spill.